














































































































What new ﬁndings can this paper claim to offer given the wealth of research on PPP
in the past? It ﬁrst should be noted that empirical support for PPP has waxed and
waned over the years. From an historical standpoint, there have been numerousstudies
of PPP for various countries over the period in question, some covering a particular
era or monetary regime. McCloskey and Zecher (1984) argued that PPP worked very
wellunderthe Anglo-Americangoldstandardbefore1914. Diebold, Husted, andRush
(1991) explored a very long run of nineteenth century data for six countries, and found
supportforPPPbasedonthelow-frequencyinformationlackinginshort-samplestudies.
Abauf and Jorion (1990) studied a century of dollar-franc-sterling exchange rate data
and veriﬁed PPP; Lothian and M. P. Taylor (1996) found the same for two centuries of
dollar-franc-sterling data. Lothian (1990) also found evidence that real exchange rates
were stationary for Japan, the U.S., the U.K., and France for the period 1875-1986,
although yen exchange rates exhibited only trend-stationarity—an oft-repeated ﬁnding
that the real yen exchangerate has appreciated over the long run against all currencies.
In full length monographs, both Lee (1978) and Ofﬁcer (1982) found strong evidence
in favor of PPP based on analysis of long time-series running from the pre-1914 gold
standard to the managed ﬂoat of the 1970s.1
Of late, new studies have appeared in abundance. In their recent comprehensive
reviewofthepurchasing-powerparityliterature,FrootandRogoff(1995)coulddeclare
that what was a “fairly dull research topic” only a decade ago has recently been the
focus of substantial controversy and the subject of a growing body of literature. Re-
cent empirical research, mostly based on the time-series analysis of short spans of data
for the ﬂoating-rate (post-Bretton Woods) era led many to conclude that PPP failed to
hold, and that the real exchange rate followed a random walk, with no mean-reversion
property. However,a newlyemergingliterature exploitsmoredata and higher-powered
techniques, and claims that, in the long run, PPP does indeed hold: it appears from
these studies that real exchange rates exhibit mean reversion with a half-life of devi-
ations of four to ﬁve years (M. P. Taylor 1995; Froot and Rogoff 1995). The newer
ﬁndingsusevariousstepstoexpandthesizeofsamplesusedtotestPPP.Asnoted,ithas
been possible to use much longer-runtime series for certain individualcountries, span-
ning a century or more; typically such exercises have concentrated on more-developed
countries with good historical data availability (for example, U.S., Britain, France).
Alternatively,researchershaveexpandedthe dataforthe recentﬂoat orpostwar periods
cross-sectionally to exploit the additional information in panel data (Wei and Parsley
1995; Frankel and Rose 1995; Pedroni 1995; Higgins and Zakrajšek 1999).
It is still too early to say whether the revisionist PPP ﬁndings will proverobust, and
already challenges to this interpretation have emerged. One may ﬁnd fault with the
ways in which cross-section information and panel methodologies have been applied
(O’Connell 1996, 1998). Some have noted that the inferences based on panel methods
aresensitiveto sampleselection, andmanyresultsappearsensitiveto thechoiceofbase
country, for example, the U.S. versus Germany (Papell 1995; Wei and Parsley 1995;
1Obviously, this paper builds on a very strong foundation of historical work by a number of scholars,
covering various countries in different time periods. Other studies of long run data are numerous (Frankel
1986; Edison 1987; Johnson 1990; Glen 1992; Kim 1990).
1Edison, Gagnon, and Melick 1995). Others caution that detecting a unit root in time
series may be complicated by the fact that price indices can be viewed as the sum of a
stationarytradablerelative-pricecomponentandanon-stationarynon-tradablerelative-
price component(Engel2000;Ng and Perron 1999). This ﬁnding echoesthe venerable
Balassa-Samuelson objection to the pure PPP hypothesis based on differential rates of
productivity growth in traded and non-traded goods sectors (Balassa 1964; Samuelson
1964). Of course, such long-run trends may be purely deterministic (Obstfeld 1993).
The distinction of the present study is to bring very recent empirical innovations
to a longer span of historical data, both to investigate the robustness of the recent
ﬁndings and to explore the historical evolution of PPP. I proceed as follows. Section
2 introduces the real exchange rate data and preliminary analysis shows that old-style
univariate tests cannot reject the unit root null. Section 3 examines a multivariate test
ofPPP by M. P. Taylorand Sarno(1998). Inthe search ofa morepowerfultest, Section
4 applies the univariateefﬁcient tests of Elliott, Rothenberg,and Stock (1996). We ﬁnd
thatlong-runPPP can be supportedin all cases with allowance for deterministictrends.
The importance of the long-run trends is explained in Section 5 where I model
the dynamics of real exchange rates at different times in the twentieth century. Four
regimesareinvestigated,thegoldstandard1870–1914,theinterwarperiod1914–45,the
Bretton-Woods era 1946–71, and the recent ﬂoat 1971–96. The important quantitative
differencesfound are in residual variance, and the ﬂoating regimes exhibit much larger
shocks to the real exchange rate process, accounting for the much larger deviations
from PPP during these eras. Thus, the history of PPP in the twentieth century shows,
surprisingly, that there was relatively little change in the ability of international market
integrationto smoothoutrealexchangerate shocks. Instead,I argue,the changesin the
varianceofthe shocksreveala greatdealaboutthe differingdegreestowhichmonetary
policywas keptin checkor notby commitmentmechanisms(underﬁxed rates) or their
absence (under ﬂoating). In light of this, I end with a discussion that relates these
ﬁndingsto the questionof thepolitical economyofmonetaryandexchange-rateregime
choice under the constraints imposed by the macroeconomic policy trilemma.
Data and Preliminary Analysis
The data consist of annual exchange rates Eit, measured as domestic currency units
per U.S. dollar, and price indices Pit, measured as consumer price deﬂators—or, when
they are not available, GDP deﬂators. We will refer to the log levels of these variables,
denoted eit = log Eit and pit = log Pit. The index i = 1,...,20 covers the set
of countries Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal,Spain,Sweden,Switzerland,theUnitedKingdom,andtheUnitedStates. The
indext runs overthe set of yearsfrom 1850 to 1996,but a completecross-section of 20
exchange rates does not exist before 1892, the starting date of the Swiss series.2
2InconstructingthedatasetIhavereliedonstandardsources. After1948theseriesaretakenfromtheIMF’s
InternationalFinancialStatisticsonCD-ROM.Theprincipalpre-1948pricesourcesarethestatisticalvolumes
of Brian Mitchell. For the provision of electronically-compiled price and exchange rate data from these and
other sources I am grateful to Michael Bordo. An appendix containing the data and full documentation is
available from the author upon request.
2Given these data, some preliminary transformations and tests were performed. Let
the U.S. dollar-denominated price level of country i at time t be denoted by Rit =
Pit/Eit, with rit = log Rit = pit − eit. As an initial step, missing data were ﬁlled in
for each series. In all cases, this amounted to imputing a value to a few wartime years
for certain countries, using linear interpolation on rit. This yields a balanced 20× 105
panel of data from 1892 to 1996.
Such an interpolation procedure may be ad hoc, but it was deemed necessary to
give any stationarity test a fair chance on this data, since, in several cases, the missing
dataappearafterexplosiveinﬂationsduringwhichrealexchangerateoftendepreciated.
Without interpolationin these periods, any subsequentreversion back toward the mean
(or trend) in this variable would be missed by any estimation procedure, and a bias
against stationarity would result. An important example would be the wide divergence
in real exchange rates in the 1930s following the collapse of the gold standard; this
episode was followed by war, leading to many missing observations in the data, and
thus much of the reversion of these divergent real exchange rates toward PPP during
and after the war would be omitted from the sample absent any interpolation.
Withinterpolationscomplete,therealexchangerateserieswasgeneratedtwoways:
ﬁrst, relative to the U.S. dollar, as qit = rit −rUS,t; and second, relative to the “world”
(N = 20) basket of currencies, as qW
it = rit − rW




j =i rjt.3 The
seconddeﬁnitionfollowsO’Connell(1996),andmayhelpusavoidproblemsassociated
with the choice of the United States as a base country.4
The complete series qit and qW
it for all 20 countries are shown in Figure 1. One
way to testthe PPP hypothesisis to ask: are these realexchangeratesstationary,thatis,
mean-reverting? A cursory inspection suggests that for many countries real exchange
rateshavebeenfairlystableoverthelongrun,andwe mightexpecttoeasilysupportthe
hypothesisof stationarity. Nonetheless, our eyesare drawnto certaincases where there
appearsto bea long-runtrendorrandomwalk. Here,the mostobviousandwell-known
problem would be the case of Japan, but similar symptoms of drift or nonstationarity
mightalsobeperceivedforSwitzerland,Brazil,andinsomeothercountries’experience
in speciﬁc periods, such as interwar Germany and Italy. Clearly, a powerful statistical
test will be needed to resolve this question.
We can begin analysis using more traditional unit root tests. Table 1 shows the
results of applying the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests to the univariate
real exchangerate series, and the results are expectedgiven the ﬁndingsin the previous
literature.5 In many cases, the unit root null cannot be rejected. Even allowing a trend
tobepresentdoesnotseemtohelpverymuch,andthenullisnotrejectedinmostcases.
However, a simple OLS regression on a constant and a trend seems to indicate that, for
at least some of the series, a deterministic trend mightbe present; this trend component
is a sizeable 1.5% per annum in the case of Japan, 0.74% per annum for Switzerland,
3Ideally, one might prefer to use trade-weighted real exchange rates, but such data do not exist in the form
of annual time series for the entire twentieth century for a wide sample of countries. Future research would
need to be directed to original sources to collate the necessary bilateral trade volumes, and this would be a
signiﬁcant undertaking.
4This discussion was omitted in O’Connell (1998).
5Lag lengths in the ADF tests were chosen by the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) criterion for residual serial
correlation, allowing up to a maximum of 6 lags.
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Notes and Sources: See text and appendix. The thicker line shows qit, the real exchange rate relative to the
U.S. dollar. The thinner line shows qW
it , the real exchange rate relative to the “world” (N = 20) basket of
currencies.
5Table 1: Preliminary Data Analysis
Demeaned Detrended OLS
T ADF LM ADF LM Trend
Base: United States
Argentina 113 -4.85 *** 0 -4.81 *** 0 -0.0013
Australia 127 -2.44 0 -3.04 0 -0.0030 ***
Belgium 117 -3.25 ** 0 -3.85 ** 0 0.0053 ***
Brazil 108 -2.74 * 1 -2.70 1 0.0000
Canada 127 -2.59 * 0 -3.76 ** 0 -0.0011 ***
Denmark 117 -2.16 0 -2.77 0 0.0033 ***
Finland 116 -4.50 *** 0 -4.63 *** 0 0.0016 **
France 117 -3.54 *** 1 -4.18 *** 1 -0.0030 ***
Germany 117 -2.96 ** 1 -3.28 * 1 0.0029 ***
Italy 117 -3.27 ** 0 -3.27 * 0 0.0005
Japan 112 -0.29 0 -1.99 0 0.0151 ***
Mexico 111 -2.96 ** 0 -3.91 ** 0 -0.0065 ***
Netherlands 127 -2.00 0 -2.27 0 0.0022 ***
Norway 127 -2.41 0 -2.61 0 0.0025 ***
Portugal 107 -2.60 * 0 -2.46 0 -0.0037 ***
Spain 117 -2.34 0 -2.25 0 -0.0019 ***
Sweden 117 -2.78 * 0 -3.44 ** 0 0.0032 ***
Switzerland 105 -1.93 1 -3.43 ** 1 0.0083 ***
United Kingdom 127 -3.19 ** 0 -3.41 * 0 -0.0014 ***
Base: “World” Basket
Argentina 105 -5.19 *** 0 -5.32 *** 0 -0.0029 **
Australia 105 -2.38 0 -3.56 ** 0 -0.0045 ***
Belgium 105 -3.44 ** 0 -4.07 *** 0 0.0051 ***
Brazil 105 -2.32 0 -2.26 0 -0.0017
Canada 105 -1.24 0 -2.04 0 -0.0033 ***
Denmark 105 -2.84 * 0 -3.35 * 0 0.0028 ***
Finland 105 -4.70 *** 0 -4.69 *** 0 -0.0002
France 105 -2.59 * 0 -3.96 ** 0 -0.0038 ***
Germany 105 -1.80 0 -1.80 0 0.0017 ***
Italy 105 -3.20 ** 0 -3.19 * 0 -0.0004
Japan 105 -0.97 0 -2.35 0 0.0150 ***
Mexico 105 -1.45 2 -4.44 *** 1 -0.0084 ***
Netherlands 105 -2.13 0 -2.54 0 0.0027 ***
Norway 105 -2.50 0 -2.51 0 0.0012 **
Portugal 105 -2.93 ** 0 -3.71 ** 0 -0.0051 ***
Spain 105 -2.03 0 -2.30 0 -0.0030 ***
Sweden 105 -2.67 * 0 -2.54 0 0.0017 ***
Switzerland 105 -1.05 0 -2.75 0 0.0074 ***
United Kingdom 105 -2.00 0 -2.88 0 -0.0032 ***
United States 105 -2.34 0 -2.53 0 -0.0013 **
Notes and Sources: See text and appendix. T is the sample size. ADF is the augmented Dickey-
Fuller statistic with LMthelaglength selected bytheLagrange Multiplier criterion. Demeaned is
the case where each series is replaced by the residuals from a regression on a constant. Detrended
is the case where the regression is on a constant and a linear trend. Trend is the OLS estimate of
the linear trend. Finite-sample critical values are shown based on 4,000 simulations of the null;
∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level; ∗∗∗denotes
signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
6but is small (no more than half a percent per year) in all other cases. All in all, we are
left with the conclusion that although some of the series may be I(1),m a n ya r eI(0)
and most, in addition, have some deterministic drift. This impression is given whether
one uses the U.S as a base country, or one measures real exchange rates relative to the
“world” basket.
One traditional response to such ﬁndings has always been to fault these tests for
their lack of power, and to point to the fact that, with slow convergence speeds, the
autoregressive parameter might be very close to unity, and one would need a very long
spanofdatatorejectthenull(Frankel1990). Withovera centuryofdata, wemightjust
have sufﬁcient span to have a reasonably powerful test, but we are still unable to ﬁnd
broad evidence of stationarity. The recent literature suggests two possible directions:
the use of multivariate or panel methods, and the use of more efﬁcient univariate tests.
We pursue both routes, to see which, if any, might lend support to the PPP hypothesis.
A Multivariate Test
If PPP holdsamonga set of N +1 countries, this wouldimply thateverysingle log real
exchange rate, for all N(N + 1)/2 bilateral pairs, would be stationary. One axiomatic
propertyof well-deﬁnedPPP measures is base countryinvariance. Thatis, the concept
of PPP must be invariant to the choice of base country. Thus we may, without loss of
generality, take a particular choice of a base country, and then consider the N bilateral
log rates relative to that country.6
An elegant test for the stationarity of these, and hence all, log rates was proposed
by M. P. Taylor and Sarno (1998). They note that a necessary and sufﬁcient condition
that all N series be stationary would be the existence of N independent cointegrating
vectors among the series (Engle and Granger 1987). Conversely, if one takes the null
to be the absence of such a condition, that is, the existence of any nonstationary real
exchange rates, the null would correspond to a situation where the N series had fewer
than N cointegrating vectors.
These hypotheses permit some simple tests based on the cointegration methods of
Johansen (1988, 1991). To brieﬂy review this approach, let qt = (q1t,...,qNt) be
the N × 1 vector of real exchange rates at time t. Under the PPP hypothesis, all N
componentsof q are I(0). The error-correctionrepresentation for the dynamics of q is
 qt =  1 qt−1 + ... k−1 qt−k+1 +  kqt−k + µ + ωt.
The N × N matrix  k has rank equal to the number of cointegrating vectors, so the
null hypothesis of one or more nonstationary series is: H0 : rank( k)<N,a n dt h e
alternative hypothesis where all series are stationary is: H1 : rank( k) = N.S i n c e
full rank of  k would imply that all of the eigenvaluesare nonzero, a test of H1 against
a null of H0 amounts to a test of the restriction that the smallest eigenvalue λN of the
estimated  k matrix is zero. The Johansen likelihood ratio test statistic for this case is
JLR =− T ln(1 − λN) where JLR has an asymptotic distribution that is χ2(1).
6All log real exchange rates between bilateral pairs can then be derived, assuming arbitrage amongst all
cross-rates in the exchange market, as linear combinations of the set of N log rates for the given base country.
7Table 2: Johansen Likelihood Ratio Test
Demeaned Detrended
Base: World SIM JLR p power JLR p power
Group 1: Europe
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, U.K. Netherlands 4,032 1.77 [.37] 0.25 5.04 [.01] 0.02
excluding Netherlands 3,968 2.99 [.18] 0.31 4.77 [.02] 0.02
excluding Netherlands and Germany 3,840 3.80 [.13] 0.43 8.09 [.00] 0.02
Group 2: Scandinavia
Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway 3,840 3.11 [.22] 0.54 4.09 [.14] 0.29
excluding Norway 3,584 7.41 [.02] 0.60 7.25 [.03] 0.40
Group 3: Iberia and Latin America
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Portugal, Spain 3,968 4.06 [.08] 0.33 4.86 [.01] 0.02
Group 4: Other
Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Japan 3,840 0.65 [.59] 0.12 4.34 [.03] 0.01
excluding Switzerland and Japan 3,072 6.53 [.03] 0.23 7.64 [.01] 0.07
Notes and Sources: See text and appendix. JLR is the Johansen Likelihood Ratio test statistic. The ﬁnite-
sample signiﬁcance level is based on SIM simulations estimated under the assumptions of the null. The
power of the 5% test is based on 4,096 simulations estimated under the assumptions of the alternative.
The chief merit of this test may be the clean speciﬁcation of null and alternative
hypotheses. Other mutlivariate tests based on panel methods, such as the multivariate
form of the ADF test, may reject a unit root null when only some of the series are
stationary, but not all N.7 A multivariate approach also places further restrictions on
any empirical framework. Given the base-country-invariance postulate, the structure
imposesk lagsofthe qt inallequationsofthesystem. Sucharestrictionis commonly
not a feature of univariate tests of PPP using single-country exchange rate series, yet it
oughtto be presentif we are really thinkingin terms of a jointhypothesistest involving
the stationarity of all the series taken together. But what lag choice should one make?
In the previous section, the tests performed in Table 1 report a variety of lag lengths
selected bythe LagrangeMultipliercriterion. By inspection, we note that, the maximal
lag length is two, so I chose k = 2l a g sf o rt h eJLR test, as the minimal lag length that
should eliminate serial correlation from all univariate series.
The results of applying the Taylor-Sarno JLR test are shown in Table 2, with ﬁnite-
sample signiﬁcance levels and power calculations. The results shown are those for the
real exchange rate relative to a “world” base, but the results using the U.S. as a base
country are similar and are omitted to save space. The width of the panel is potentially
a problem here: we have N = 20 where M. P. Taylor and Sarno had N = 4. Empirical
implementation would be inefﬁcient, clumsy, and costly if I attempted to estimate a
20-equationVAR for the dynamic equation, so I elected to work with four subsets with
between four and six countries in each.8
7Other tests maysuffer from a “missing middle”—the null is that all N series are I(1), but the alternative
of interest is that all N series are I(0). This structure fails to recognize that there are many intermediate
cases, where some series are stationary and some are not. This seems particularly relevant to our empirical
task, since the data in Figure 1 and the preliminary data analysis in Table 1 suggest that we might well have
such intermediate cases.
8I thank a referee for suggesting this partitioning approach. Finite-sample signiﬁcance levels and power
are derived by simulation. In simulations with N ≤ 6 series there are 2N − 1 combinations of I(1) and
I(0) series that satisfy the null, and only one, with every series I(0), that satisﬁes the alternative. I ran
212 = 4,096 simulations on each test, with each null combination simulated 212−N times.
8The JLR tests are somewhat favorable to the PPP hypothesis for most countries,
but only when allowance is made for a trend. In the cases with trend, stationarity is
accepted at a better than 10% signiﬁcance level, except for the case of Norway which
just breaks that signiﬁcance threshold. As expected,the power of test is low and it falls
dramaticallywhenatrendisincluded. Thisreﬂectsacommonproblemintheliterature,
namely the low power of tests to detect trend stationarity in favor of a unit root null. In
the tests without a trend, stationarity is rarely accepted, except for Denmark, Finland,
Sweden, Australia and Canada, just 5 countries out of 20. The results suggest that the
JLR tests, in this particular sample, suffer from the weak power problem identiﬁed by




The most powerful univariate unit root tests available at present are the generalized-
least-squares (GLS) versions of the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test due to Elliott, Rothenberg,
and Stock (1996). The tests are of broad applicability since they apply to cases where
the series have: (i) no trend; (ii) a deterministic constant term dt = (1);a n d( iii)a
deterministic constant term and drift dt = (1,t). We are, as always, working with
index numbersin PPP tests, and we also might want to allow for possible deterministic
trends in the spirit of Balassa-Samuelson, so the DF-GLS test is very relevant.
In the DF-GLS test, the series zt to be tested is replaced in the ADF regression by
˜ zt = zt − ˆ β dt,where ˆ β  isaGLSestimateofthecoefﬁcientsonthedeterministictrends
dt. That the DF-GLS test dominates others is shown via a local-to-unity asymptotic
approach,andthepowerenvelopeisclosetothefrontier. Theunit-rootPPPcontroversy
hangs on being able to pin down an autoregressive parameter ρ that is less than, but
often very close to, unity. Hence, the DF-GLS test is an ideal tool for PPP testing.9
Table 3 shows the results of applying the DF-GLS tests to our real exchange rate
data. The format repeats that of Table 1. Four cases are considered: using the U.S.
and the “world” basket as a base; and using the series demeaned and detrended. These
results offer powerful support for the PPP hypothesis in the twentieth century. In all
cases without detrending the null of a unit root is rejected, and in most cases even with
a trend, though the test is less powerful there. Hence, with some allowance for the
possibility of slowly-evolvinglong-runtrends, I concludethat PPP has held in the long
run over the twentieth century for my sample of 20 countries.10
If PPP holds in the long run, it is no longer productiveto devote further attention to
thestationarityquestion. Themoreimportantandinterestingproblemistoexplainwhat
drives the short-run dynamics of real exchange rates.11 That is, how do we account for
the amplitude and persistence of deviations from PPP, in different time periods and in
different countries in the last century?
9The DF-GLS test gives support for PPP in the post-Bretton Woods era (Cheung and Lai 1998).
10It would be desirable to follow up this study in the future with tests based on higher-frequency data. Still,
that we can ﬁnd evidence in favor of PPP with annual series is very encouraging indeed, given the biases
introduced by temporal averaging in historical data (Taylor 2001).
11The same conclusion was reached by Higgins and Zakrajšek (1999).
9Table 3: DF-GLS Tests
Base: United States Base: “World” Basket
Demeaned Detrended Demeaned Detrended
Argentina -4.79 *** -4.76 *** -5.13 *** -5.31 ***
Australia -2.45 ** -3.10 ** -2.47 *** -3.59 ***
Belgium -3.23 *** -3.89 *** -3.45 *** -4.10 ***
Brazil -2.70 *** -2.79 ** -2.34 ** -2.36
Canada -2.60 ** -3.98 *** -1.47 * -2.29
Denmark -2.20 ** -2.86 ** -2.85 *** -3.39 ***
Finland -4.49 *** -4.67 *** -4.67 *** -4.72 ***
France -3.54 *** -4.15 *** -2.62 *** -4.00 ***
Germany -2.94 *** -3.30 *** -1.81 * -1.83
Italy -3.28 *** -3.30 *** -3.20 *** -3.22 **
Japan -0.93 ** -2.12 -1.55 *** -2.37 *
Mexico -2.96 *** -3.95 *** -1.62 * -4.46 ***
Netherlands -2.06 ** -2.33 -2.15 ** -2.58 *
Norway -2.46 *** -2.65 * -2.52 ** -2.54 *
Portugal -2.62 *** -2.63 ** -2.94 *** -3.75 ***
Spain -2.35 ** -2.35 * -2.05 ** -2.34
Sweden -2.79 *** -3.47 *** -2.68 *** -2.73 **
Switzerland -2.13 ** -3.41 *** -1.39 * -2.79 **
United Kingdom -3.18 *** -3.46 *** -2.06 ** -2.92 **
United States —— -2.37 ** -2.61 *
Notes andSources: SeeTable 1, text, and appendix. Thelag length is selected bytheLagrange Multiplier
criterion. Demeaned is the case where each series is replaced by the residuals from a regression on a
constant. Detrended is the case where the regression is on a constant and a linear trend. Finite-sample
critical values are shown based on 4,000 simulations of the null. ∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%
level; ∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level; ∗∗∗denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level. The critical
values corresponding to these signiﬁcance levels are (−1.62,−1.95,−2.58) for the demeaned series and
(−2.57,−2.89,−3.48) for the detrended series, respectively. See Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996).
An Overview of PPP in the Twentieth Century
Inthis section, giventheearlier ﬁndings,deviationsfromPPP willbe measuredrelative
to the equilibrium real exchange rate. As we have seen, it is necessary to allow for
slowly-evolving deterministic trends. As an empirical matter, they are usually found
to be “small.” However, their omission would undoubtedly upset any study of the
deviations of real exchange rates over the very long run.12 Accordingly, I will, for the
remainder of this paper, consider the dynamics of detrended real exchange rates in an
attempt to measure the reversion speed toward equilibrium.
The ﬁrst question to ask is: what have been the extent of deviations from PPP over
the long run? One way to answer this question is to examine volatility via the size
of changes in the real exchange rate  qit, since, according a mean-reversion theory,
this change would be proportional to the deviation from equilibrium plus some error.
Another approach would be to detrend the series qit and examine the deviations of
the resulting detrended level qit, that is, the error-correction term. For a cross section
of countries, the extent of these deviations at a given time t can be measured by the
standard deviations σ( qit) and σ(qit). Figure 2 shows these measures for our entire
sample and both exhibit similar trends.
12A trend of, say, 0.5% per annum might make little difference over a one to ten year horizon, but over one
hundred years, if such a correction were left out, then log deviations from equilibrium could be mismeasured
by an additive shift of 0.5, or in levels by a multiplicative shift of 65%.
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the heyday of Bretton Woods during the 1960s. Once the ﬂoating rate era began in the
1970s, deviations and volatility once again rose. This chronology offers some prima
facie reasons to view changes in the exchange rate regime as a major determinant of
real exchange rate behavior, an idea we will keep in mind.
Althoughwe can now see fromthe data where and whendeviationshave been large
or small, we would like to know why they were large or small at particular times. In
an autoregressive model, any changes in the properties of the deviations can only be
attributed to two essential causes: either the dynamic process is subject to (stochastic)
shocks of different amplitude; or else the process itself exhibits different patterns of
(deterministic) persistence. To investigate this more fully, then, we need to apply and
estimate a model. Given that we are taking trend stationarity as given, based on earlier
ﬁndings,Table 4 reportsthe resultsof ﬁtting an error-correctionmodelto the detrended
U.S.-based real exchange rate qit, with a speciﬁcation
 qit = β0qit + β1 qi,t−1 + β2 qi,t−2 +  t.
Thecoefﬁcientsβ1andβ2arenotreported;columnslabeledi andt indicatethesamples,
includingpooledsamples(P)acrossbothcountriesandtimeperiods;periodscorrespond
to the exchange rate regimes, Gold Standard (G), Interwar (I), Bretton Woods (B), and
Float (F); halﬂives in years are reported (H); and signiﬁcance levels are reported for
tests of pooling across periods (p1) and countries (p2).13
13The lag choice k = 2w a ss u f ﬁcient based on LM tests in all cases except the cross-country pooled
samples. A uniform lag structure was imposed to facilitate pooling tests.
11Table 4: A Model of Real Exchange Rates
it β0 s.e. R
2 TH p1 p2 it β0 s.e. R
2 TH p1
P P -0.21 (0.01) .11 2,293 3.4 .00 .00 ITA P -0.25 (0.06) .15 114 3.6 .00
P G -0.21 (0.03) .13 633 3.1 .01 ITA G -0.36 (0.15) .28 31 1.9
P I -0.24 (0.03) .20 640 3.1 .88 ITA I 0.00 (0.14) .09 32 -21.8
P B -0.43 (0.03) .28 520 1.5 .63 ITA B -0.54 (0.06) .81 26 1.0
P F -0.41 (0.04) .19 500 2.1 .99 ITA F -0.32 (0.16) .38 25 2.3
ARG P -0.47 (0.10) .20 110 1.5 .96 JPN P -0.09 (0.04) .15 109 9.3 .07
ARG G -0.09 (0.12) .09 27 6.0 JPN G -0.27 (0.14) .26 26 2.9
ARG I -0.18 (0.10) .14 32 4.1 JPN I -0.08 (0.06) .29 32 8.9
ARG B -0.47 (0.20) .22 26 1.4 JPN B -0.25 (0.11) .69 26 1.6
ARG F -0.59 (0.24) .24 25 1.2 JPN F -0.35 (0.15) .23 25 1.8
AUS P -0.18 (0.05) .11 124 4.7 .15 MEX P -0.25 (0.07) .15 108 2.4 .47
AUS G -0.19 (0.07) .30 41 5.2 MEX G -0.09 (0.14) .31 25 3.6
AUS I -0.34 (0.13) .20 32 2.3 MEX I -0.15 (0.09) .16 32 6.2
AUS B -0.23 (0.13) .14 26 4.0 MEX B -0.45 (0.17) .25 26 1.6
AUS F -0.53 (0.18) .32 25 1.6 MEX F -0.45 (0.23) .27 25 1.1
BEL P -0.30 (0.07) .21 114 2.6 1.00 NLD P -0.11 (0.04) .13 124 7.8 .09
BEL G -0.31 (0.14) .16 31 2.3 NLD G -0.12 (0.06) .13 41 6.8
BEL I -0.31 (0.14) .21 32 2.5 NLD I -0.23 (0.11) .21 32 3.8
BEL B -0.29 (0.10) .39 26 2.1 NLD B -0.21 (0.13) .13 26 3.2
BEL F -0.34 (0.13) .39 25 3.0 NLD F -0.37 (0.14) .37 25 2.1
BRA P -0.13 (0.06) .07 105 4.8 .37 NOR P -0.15 (0.04) .20 124 6.2 .08
BRA G -0.46 (0.14) .38 22 2.0 NOR G -0.31 (0.09) .39 41 2.7
BRA I -0.27 (0.10) .24 32 2.4 NOR I -0.20 (0.09) .36 32 4.8
BRA B -0.48 (0.18) .28 26 1.2 NOR B -0.35 (0.16) .18 26 2.0
BRA F -0.22 (0.17) .10 25 3.9 NOR F -0.42 (0.14) .34 25 2.0
CAN P -0.20 (0.06) .10 124 3.4 .20 PRT P -0.17 (0.06) .10 104 5.2 .05
CAN G -0.10 (0.10) .05 41 3.2 PRT G -0.13 (0.14) .11 21 3.0
CAN I -0.19 (0.11) .22 32 3.3 PRT I -0.48 (0.16) .25 32 1.7
CAN B -0.25 (0.15) .19 26 2.2 PRT B -0.18 (0.07) .50 26 3.3
CAN F -0.35 (0.13) .33 25 5.0 PRT F -0.17 (0.11) .32 25 5.2
DNK P -0.15 (0.05) .10 114 4.9 .00 SPA P -0.13 (0.04) .15 114 7.1 .01
DNK G -0.60 (0.19) .38 31 1.5 SPA G -0.21 (0.14) .10 31 3.0
DNK I -0.36 (0.14) .28 32 2.2 SPA I -0.27 (0.11) .30 32 3.5
DNK B -0.55 (0.18) .35 26 0.8 SPA B -0.41 (0.15) .29 26 1.3
DNK F -0.38 (0.14) .35 25 2.4 SPA F -0.22 (0.10) .48 25 2.8
FIN P -0.39 (0.08) .28 113 1.8 .21 SWE P -0.23 (0.06) .19 114 3.3 .82
FIN G -0.21 (0.11) .25 30 4.3 SWE G -0.30 (0.12) .31 31 2.9
FIN I -0.40 (0.16) .35 32 1.8 SWE I -0.28 (0.14) .21 32 2.4
FIN B -0.57 (0.22) .51 26 0.5 SWE B -0.27 (0.15) .21 26 2.3
FIN F -0.41 (0.14) .38 25 2.0 SWE F -0.37 (0.15) .29 25 2.6
FRA P -0.22 (0.06) .17 114 3.3 .03 SWI P -0.13 (0.05) .21 102 5.0 .04
FRA G -0.51 (0.23) .27 31 0.9 SWI G -0.38 (0.24) .45 19 0.7
FRA I -0.44 (0.15) .33 32 1.7 SWI I -0.29 (0.12) .37 32 3.1
FRA B -0.64 (0.20) .34 26 1.3 SWI B -0.28 (0.06) .60 26 2.1
FRA F -0.36 (0.14) .35 25 2.4 SWI F -0.36 (0.14) .34 25 1.7
GER P -0.10 (0.04) .23 114 6.8 .13 UKG P -0.20 (0.06) .10 124 3.6 .10
GER G -0.19 (0.12) .16 31 3.5 UKG G -0.22 (0.10) .14 41 1.9
GER I -0.06 (0.05) .31 32 16.0 UKG I -0.27 (0.14) .21 32 2.6
GER B -0.23 (0.06) .56 26 2.3 UKG B -0.42 (0.13) .35 26 1.5
GER F -0.36 (0.15) .33 25 2.2 UKG F -0.42 (0.19) .20 25 1.7
Notes and Sources: See text and appendix. The country abbreviations are: ARG Argentina; AUS Australia;
BEL Belgium; BRA Brazil; CAN Canada; DNK Denmark; FIN Finland; FRA France; GER Germany; ITA
Italy; JPN Japan; MEX Mexico; NLD Netherlands; NOR Norway; PRT Portugal; SPA Spain; SWE Sweden;
SWI Switzerland; UKG United Kingdom. Samples are P Pooled; G Gold Standard; I Interwar; B Bretton
Woods; F Float.
12Table 5: Model Halﬂives and Error Disturbances
Halflife SEE
PG IBF PG IBF
Pooled 3.4 3.0 3.1 1.6 2.1 .14 .05 .15 .11 .20
Argentina 1.8 7.2 4.0 1.6 1.5 .33 .08 .12 .25 .64
Australia 4.3 3.0 2.6 4.1 2.1 .08 .04 .11 .08 .08
Belgium 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.6 3.1 .19 .07 .35 .04 .11
Brazil 4.9 0.8 2.6 1.5 3.3 .26 .07 .15 .30 .39
Canada 3.9 6.0 2.8 2.7 3.7 .04 .04 .04 .05 .04
Denmark 4.4 1.5 2.4 0.8 2.8 .10 .04 .11 .11 .11
Finland 1.9 3.9 2.0 0.6 2.5 .16 .04 .26 .12 .10
France 3.2 1.0 2.0 1.6 2.7 .08 .06 .08 .06 .10
Germany 7.2 2.7 11.7 4.5 2.5 .07 .03 .08 .04 .11
Italy 3.6 1.5 — 2.1 2.5 .14 .03 .20 .09 .10
Japan 8.4 3.2 8.8 3.9 2.2 .09 .07 .09 .04 .12
Mexico 2.1 6.2 5.3 2.2 1.3 .17 .10 .15 .13 .27
Netherlands 6.4 6.3 3.5 3.9 2.6 .08 .03 .10 .08 .11
Norway 5.3 3.4 4.2 2.4 2.7 .09 .03 .13 .09 .09
Portugal 4.7 4.2 2.2 4.1 4.2 .13 .06 .19 .05 .10
Spain 5.8 3.0 3.3 2.1 3.2 .11 .07 .13 .09 .10
Sweden 3.0 2.9 2.4 2.1 2.8 .09 .03 .11 .08 .12
Switzerland 5.2 0.7 3.0 1.8 2.1 .09 .03 .10 .03 .12
United Kingdom 3.7 3.1 2.5 2.3 2.1 .08 .02 .08 .07 .13
Mean 4.3 3.3 3.7 2.4 2.6 .13 .05 .14 .10 .16
Standard Deviation 1.8 1.9 2.5 1.1 0.7 .07 .02 .07 .07 .14
Median 4.1 3.0 2.8 2.1 2.6 .10 .04 .12 .08 .11
Notes and Sources: See text and appendix. Samples are P Pooled; G Gold Standard; I Interwar; B Bretton
Woods; F Float.
Note thatthese resultsareoftenforveryshortspansof data,so thatwe arenotusing
the coefﬁcient β0 as a basis for a stationarity test. Rather, we now have a maintained
hypothesisof long run trend stationarity based on the earlier tests. The pooling restric-
tions are not always rejected, but sufﬁciently often that is seems safest to treat this as a
heterogeneous panel, and examine the nature of the dynamics in different periods and
countries. ThisispursuedinTable5,byfocusingonthetwokeyfeatures—onerandom,
onenot—thatgeneratePPP deviations: the halﬂife of disturbances,calculatedfrom the
estimated model via (deterministic) forecast; and the variance of the (stochastic) error
disturbances SEE = σ .14
The striking aspect of these results are the relatively small variations in halﬂives
acrossthe fourexchange-rateregimes. Therearenotableexceptions. Oneis Italyin the
interwar period, where the estimated root is explosive on this restricted sample; also,
interwar Germany has slow reversion which may not be surprising given the aftermath
of hyperinﬂation in the 1920s and the extensive controls on the economy in the 1930s
(see Figure 1).15 Still, all the other halﬂives in the table are in the low single digits as
14For a simple motivation of this rough division ofsources of deviations, consider an AR(1) process for the
real exchange rate, qt = ρqt−1+ t. The unconditional variance of qt is Var(q) = σ2
  /(1−ρ2). The halﬂife
is a simple function if the autoregressive parameter, H = ln0.5/lnρ. Thus, the numerator of Var(q) is a
function of the size of the (stochastic) shocks, and the denominator a function of the (deterministic) halﬂife.
With higher order processes the separation is not so clean, but the intuition is the same.
15Tests for PPP in the 1930s for Britain, U.S., France and Germany were undertaken by Broadberry and
M. P. Taylor (1988). Consistent with the present interpretation, they found PPP except for bilateral exchange
rates involving the mark, a result attributed to the extensive controls in the German economy.
13measured in years. The mean and median halﬂives hover around two to three years,
a timeframe even more favorable to rapid PPP adjustment than most recent empirical
studies. Thevariationinhalﬂivesaroundthemeanormedianissmall,aroundoneortwo
years in most cases. There is evidence of only a modest decline in halﬂives after World
War Two, with a drop from 3.5 years to 2.5 on average, a decline of about one third. In
sum, we have found a new, quite provocative, and remarkable result. Looking across
thetwentiethcentury,anddespiteconsiderabledifferencesininstitutionalarrangements
and market integration across time and across countries, the deterministic aspects of
persistence of PPP deviations have been fairly uniform in the international economy.16
What, then, accounts for the dramatic changes in deviations from PPP during the
twentiethcenturyseen in Figure2? As onemightguess, it is the stochasticcomponents
thathavetodomostoftheworktoaccountforthisgiventhefairlyﬂathalﬂifemeasures.
Underthe goldstandardwe ﬁndSEE = .05on average,thatis, a 5%standarddeviation
forthestochasticshocks. Thisrisesbyafactorofthreeto14%onaverageintheinterwar,
then falls by a third to 10% under Bretton Woods, before climbing by over one-half to
16% under the ﬂoat. Of course, there are some notable outliers here, such as the Latin
American economies that experience hyperinﬂation in the postwar period. We should
also note that, due to lack of accurate, synchronizeddata, the German hyperinﬂationof
the early 1920s is omitted from the data in this study, and is covered by interpolation.
To reinforce the point, Figure 3 shows a scatterplot of σ( qt) versus σ  for the AR
model ﬁtted to each country during each regime. Given the model is linear, we may
write σ( qt) = f (ρj)σ  where the ratio f is a function of all the AR coefﬁcients ρj.
With no persistence f = 1, and more persistence causes an increase in f > 1. What
is noteworthy here is how f has been uniform and almost constant over the twentieth
century. The correlation of σ( qt) and σ  has been 0.99 across all regimes. From the
regressionwe see that a forecast ofσ( qt) assuming f = 1.1yields an R2 of 0.9 anda
tinystandarderrorof 0.01. As we surmised, the persistenceofthe processeshasplayed
little role here little, and changes in the stochastic shocks explain virtually all changes
in the volatility in the real exchange rate across space and time.
Theerrordisturbancestellaconsistentstory,revealingmuchlargershockstothereal
exchange rate process under ﬂoating-rate regimes than under ﬁxed-rate regimes. This
resulthasbeenobservedincontemporarydata,butthisstudyisthemostcomprehensive
long-runanalysis, basedon morethan a centuryofdata fora broadsample ofcountries.
Of particular historical note is the emergence of the interwar period as an important
turningpoint,anerawhenPPPdeviationsshiftedtodramaticallyhigherlevels.17 Given
the vast changes in institutions and market structure over a hundred years or more, the
relationship of real exchange rate deviations to the monetary regime now looks like a
robust stylized historical fact.
A ﬁnal piece of evidence reinforces this notion. One approach to explaining real
exchange rate deviations in cross section has been to try to disengage the effects of
16Another study that examines reversion to PPP across different monetary regimes is Parsley and Popper
(1999). They focus only on postwar data for the period 1961–92 in 82 countries, but this encompasses a wide
range of exchange rate arrangements. They ﬁndonly slightly faster reversion under the dollar peg, about 12%
per year, versus pure ﬂoating, at 10% per year. This is consistent with the ﬁndings in this paper.
17On the interwar period as a turning point see Obstfeld and A. M. Taylor (1998; 2001). Interwar studies
of PPP ﬁnd results consistent with these ﬁndings (Eichengreen 1988; M. P. Taylor and McMahon (1988).











sd(dq) = b SEE + e
Adjusted R Squared 0.97




Notes and Sources: See text and appendix. Vertical axis: σ( qt). Horizontal axis: σ .
geography and currencies. Engel and Rogers (1996, 1998, 1999) have shown that
although “border effects” do matter, a very large share of deviations from parity across
countries is accounted for by the effect of currencies, that is, by nominal exchange
rate volatility.18 We can follow a similar tack here, by looking at the sample variances
for our four regimes and for each of the twenty countries. Of course, unlike Engel
and Rogers we cannot make within country comparisons, but we do have a somewhat
more controlledexperiment: using an historicalsample, as opposedto the post-Bretton
Woodsera,wedoobtainmuchgreatersamplevariationinexchangeratevolatility,even
as “geography”—needlessto say—has remained constant.
Table 6 tabulates real and nominal exchange rate volatility in the various subsam-
ples. Under the gold standard we see low real and nominal volatility among those
countries that clung hard to the rules of the game (those with zero nominal volatil-
ity); but for other countries, as the nominal volatility rose, so did the real volatility
(examine, for example, Japan and Switzerland, then Mexico, Portugal and Spain, and
ﬁnally Brazil and Argentina). Overall the cross country correlation is 0.74. Under the
mostly-ﬂoating interwar period a similar story can be told, although many more real
shocks were present in the form of terms-of-trade disturbances and ﬁnancial crises, so
it is perhaps not surprising to see the correlation fall to 0.52. Another reason that the
correlationsmightbe somewhatless than onein the earlytwentiethcenturyis that price
18An example of their approach would be to regress σ( qit) on σ( eit) and measures of distance plus a
“border” dummy (equal to one when the locations are in different countries). Within Europe, for the 1980s
and 1990s, they ﬁnd there is an almost one-to-one pass through from σ( eit) to σ( qit) (the coefﬁcient is
0.92), and an inspection of the summary statistics for each is sufﬁcient to convey the message (Engel and
Rogers 1999, Tables 2 and 3A).
15Table 6: Real Versus Nominal Exchange Rate Volatility
GIBF
σ(∆q) σ(∆e) σ(∆q) σ(∆e) σ(∆q) σ(∆e) σ(∆q) σ(∆e)
Pooled 6 5 18 16 16 18 22 47
Argentina 8 13 12 10 27 25 69 112
Australia 4 1 13 10 8 8 10 10
Belgium 7 4 43 15 5 4 13 13
Brazil 9 15 16 15 33 39 38 101
Canada 4 2 4 4 5 4 5 4
Denmark 5 2 12 13 13 12 12 12
Finland 5 0 30 21 16 18 12 12
France 7 0 11 21 8 8 12 13
Germany 3 0 9 9 5 6 13 13
Italy 3 2 20 29 20 20 12 13
Japan 9 5 11 9 4 3 13 13
Mexico 11 7 15 8 14 13 29 35
Netherlands 4 2 11 10 8 8 13 12
Norway 4 1 17 15 10 8 10 10
Portugal 7 7 21 27 7 3 12 14
Spain 7 7 18 15 9 10 13 14
Sweden 3 0 12 10 9 8 13 13
Switzerland 5 4 11 10 4 2 14 14
United Kingdom 3 0 9 9 9 8 13 14
Corr(σ(∆q),σ(∆e))
by regime 0.74 0.52 0.99 0.94
all regimes 0.87
Notes and Sources: See text and appendix.
ﬂexibilitywasalmostcertainlyhigherinthisearlierepoch,aresultnotedininternational
studies of business-cycle ﬂuctuations.19 In the postwar period the correlation is very
strong, 0.99 under Bretton Woods and 0.94 under the ﬂoat for our sample. In the ﬂoat,
Brazil and Argentina pose problems for the correlation because of their hyperinﬂation
experiences—episodeswhen,again,largepriceadjustmentswentintandemwithnomi-
nalexchangerate movements. The correlationforthe twentycountriesoverallregimes
is 0.87, and the message I take from these results is that the dominant source of PPP
failure is nominal exchange rate volatility, that is, the nature of the monetary regime.20
Finally, we might ask, why was this pattern of real and nominal exchange rate
volatility observed in twentieth century history, and what implicationsshould this have
for our research? The empirical measures shown here appear very consistent with
historical changes in monetary regimes, the associated record of institutional changes,
andthe toolsfromthe political-economynexusthat have been invokedto explainthem.
The widely accepted account of these major regime shifts relies on what Obstfeld and
19See the survey of these issues in Basu and A. M. Taylor (1999).
20Do all international relative prices move up and down together as per the aggregate real exchange
rate movement, or do they show different patterns that are less well correlated with nominal exchange rate
volatility? Absent detailed disaggregated data, we cannot show, like Engel and Rogers did (1995, 1996), how
much of these PPP deviations are common to all goods’ relative prices as a source of deviations from the
law of one price (LOOP). This would be an excellent topic for future research. However, unless contradicted
by an array of large and offsetting LOOP deviations for various goods that virtually cancel out—an unlikely
outcome—the patterns thus far are entirely consistent with the view that deviations from LOOP are similarly
traceable to deviations from aggregate PPP, which, in turn, are in large part determined by the nature of
monetary shocks, rather than barriers to trade or geography.
16A. M. Taylor (1998, 2001) term the macroeconomic policy trilemma. This trilemma is
the well-known conﬂict facing policymakers when choosing between three competing
objectives, (i)aﬁxed exchange rate, (ii) capital mobility, and (iii) activist monetary
policy, where only two out of three are feasible. Under this schema, the gold standard
saw countries forsake monetary policy (iii). The interwar was a period when either
controls,sacriﬁcing(ii),ordevaluations,sacriﬁcing(i),wereemployed. BrettonWoods
was a system of limited capital mobility, entailing the loss of (ii). The ﬂoat brought
back capital mobility at the expense of ﬁxed rates sacriﬁcing (i). Several measures of
capital mobility in the twentieth century accord with the trilemma view of history, and
historical accountspaint a similar pictureonce we examineinstitutional changeand the
actions of policymakers more closely (Eichengreen 1996).






is that inﬂation volatility and nominal exchange rate volatility—each one a monetary
phenomenon in itself—are jointly nonneutral in the sense that they are correlated with
a real effect, the size deviations from PPP (as noted by Cheung and Lai 2000). The
above correlations would then be consistent with a view that nominal exchange rates
can adjust very quickly even as other prices in the economy move more sluggishly,
an assumption common to many international macroeconomic models of older and
newer vintages (Dornbusch 1976; Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996). Further study will be
neededtoincorporatethesedynamicsintoaneconometricPPPmodelandmeasurethem
in historical (and contemporary) samples, but it does seem that monetary time series
would be extremely important as an explanatory variable, despite their considerable
endogeneity problems. In short we leave this study with the strong suspicion that for
the most part, to coin a phrase, deviations from PPP are always and everywhere a
monetary phenomenon.
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